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EMPLOYMENT DISCREMINATION
Introduction
PROF. KATSORIS: The next topic that we have is employment
discrimination. As Jack Coffee mentioned, when the Uniform
Code' 80 was first adopted by the various SROs around 1980, employ-
ment discrimination cases were not the foremost thing the Securities
Industry Conference on Arbitration ("SICA") had in mind. What we
had in mind basically were procedures for resolving disputes between
the industry and customers, whereas employment discrimination in-
volves the industry and its employees. Yet, the Supreme Court in Gil-
mer181 said that employment disputes belong in arbitration if there is
an arbitration agreement.
Difficult issues have arisen. For example, are the present pools of
arbitrators properly trained to handle these cases? Most of the SRO
arbitrators have expertise in securities issues, but not discrimination
issues. Indeed, there have been moves in Congress to excise this area
from securities arbitration and move it back to the courtroom.82
These and other issues will be discussed by our panel.
On this panel we have Judith Vladeck, who is considered one of the
leading advocates of employees in discrimination cases. She's also an
Adjunct Professor of Law at Fordham Law School.
On the opposite side is Theodore Rogers, who is with Sullivan &
Cromwell. He is an outside counsel to member firms. He has success-
fully defended many cases involving employment discrimination. He
has also participated as an instructor in the New York Stock Exchange
training program for arbitrators on employment issues.
Have you decided which one of you would like to go first, or should
I pick?
MS. VLADECK: I'm speaking first. It has been decided.
MR. ROGERS: Yes. I had assumed Ms. Vladeck would go first.
She's listed first on the agenda, in reverse alphabetical order.
MS. VLADECK: I do object, not to the order, but to the prior
restraint. You told us that we had to keep it impersonal. This is not a
subject that lends itself to dispassion.
Panelists
MS. VLADECK: I want to start by saying that I think the Ex-
change has gotten a bum rap in the way the press has dealt with its
handling of discrimination cases, or employment cases generally. I'm
180. Uniform Code, supra note 14.
181. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
182. S. 2012, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); H.R. 4981, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
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among those who have been most vocal in criticizing, but nonetheless,
I don't think it is fair.
I think there was imposed upon the Exchange a burden for which it
simply was not prepared and probably still is not prepared, that is, to
deal with public law issues for which it was not trained, had no back-
ground, no experience, and no philosophy. There was no policy that
helped in shaping the way you dealt with these burdens that were im-
posed on you by the Supreme Court, that is, the arbitration of em-
ployee discrimination claims.
I must say that you rose magnificently to the responsibility, adminis-
tratively. You got us into the process; you put us on computer; you
got our cases scheduled. But I don't think you have yet come to grips
with what you're trying to do and what you should be doing. You've
been given a major responsibility for the implementation of what
we've called an overriding public policy of the United States, that is,
the elimination of invidious discrimination in the workplace.
You got some help. Tme has taken care of some of it. You look
around this room today and read some of the name tags and you will
certainly see that this is a different group than would have been here
thirty years ago. That is, the composition of the group is certainly a
lot more diverse. You have people here of ethnic backgrounds who
would not have been any more welcome than a woman would have
been in earlier times. I still see a white-male-over-40 preponderance,
but there is some progress being made, just by accident of time and
influence from outside sources.
Nonetheless, you've been given the responsibility, in one of the
largest industries, for policing a major statutory mandate, and I don't
think any of the people who are given this responsibility or to whom it
is delegated know what they're doing. And I don't blame them. This
is not their area of competence. They haven't been trained for it.
They're not educated for it. And I'm not sure that the member firms
have yet addressed the way to deal with this huge burden that's been
placed on them.
I strongly recommend that we look at, or that you look at, or some-
body other than me look at, the history of successful arbitration in the
United States. I don't know why I've limited it to the United States.
Arbitration can be the most wonderful dispute resolution device,
going back into history when couples the world over came to their
parish priest or their local rabbi and gave him the responsibility for
deciding issues that they could not themselves resolve. We estab-
lished, historically, the practice of going to a neutral third party that
we trusted. The notion was simple: we would give that person, be-
cause of trust, the decision making that we ourselves could not
achieve.
If you look at American history, you will see that the best and most
useful, most successful arbitration procedures were introduced by in-
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dustry. If you look at the Worth Street Rules, 183 you see how the
textile industry, which learned that it was cutting its own throat, estab-
lished rules for living together. The same history is found in the gar-
ment industry, construction industry, and others.
You get to World War II and you see where so much of what we're
working with today emerged. People couldn't strike. There was im-
posed on them the obligation to work although they couldn't get wage
increases. We had to keep the war material coming, and so the War
Labor Board184 was established and conducted tripartite arbitrations.
Have you ever thought about why we have three arbitrators when it
is hard enough to live with one person's schedule? Why do we have
these three guys? "Guys" is not carelessly said. They are almost inevi-
tably three men. Why do we have them? Because the War Labor
Board created a structure. There was a public member, there was a
union side member, and there was a management member on the
Board. Those were the three groups whose interests were being
determined.
And the structure that they developed in the War Labor Board still
informs the method by which labor-management arbitration is con-
ducted today: What's the issue? What's the contract language? What
does the union say? What does the employer say? Reasoning, and
then opinion.
How much of this can be transferred or transported into the securi-
ties industry whole-cloth? Some of it? A little of it? None of it?
I'm not telling you what the answer is. I'm telling you that if you
don't look at some of the history, you are cheating yourselves out of
some direction that may be useful to you. But the essential part of it
was the trust and confidence in the structure and the procedure.
I can't blame the participants in Exchange arbitrations for having
their grave doubts about the arbitrators, even though they are all hon-
orable men, and I have no question about the integrity or the decency
of any of the people who do this. But these are not customer cases.
These are not cases in which the arbitrators think they have a role in
protecting the industry.
Professor Katsoris, I think you said it, that in customer cases, there
is concern for the protection of the consumer. You come into the cus-
tomer cases or the investor cases either with the notion of sophisti-
cated investors, or of widows and orphans needing protection against
some rogue doing something wrong, with the arbitrators having a con-
cern about the institution, about the industry. But, who has told them
183. The Worth Street Rules were a series of regulations agreed to by representa-
tives of buyers and sellers in the textile industry. The regulations set the ground rules
for negotiations over sales.
184. 50 U.S.C.A. § 961 (1991), repealed by Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, § 53, 70A Stat.
641.
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that they have to have a concern about the institution or the industry
in the way the member firms treat their employees?
Well, it wouldn't be wasteful to do that anyhow, because I think the
leadership in the next years for the elimination of discrimination in
the workplace is going to come from major, smart corporations that
know that there is a terrible waste when you exclude from the work-
place women, minorities, etc. There is a terrible, terrible waste when
you do not deal promptly and efficiently with a harassment case, an
abuse case, within the workplace.
Enough studies have been done, if you like to work with hard data,
to show you that for every harassment case that is not resolved
promptly and effectively, there is loss-loss to you, loss to the em-
ployer, loss to the member firms, loss of time, loss in production.
Someplace, somewhere along here, there has to be an announce-
ment of what policy these people are supposed to be trying to deal
with. When they deal with customer cases, they know that there's
public law out there. When they get to the employment cases, they
come in naked and ignorant.
I recommend that we go back to the basics, to what arbitration was
supposed to have been. If you look at the label or the logo of the
American Arbitration Association or some of the other leaders in dis-
pute resolutions, the notion is that it's going to be fast, it's going to be
cheap, and it's going to be fair.185
I urge that in the period of development of these policies that will
determine the future of arbitration in your industry, in dealing with
employment cases, that you do not take your advice from lawyers for
the member firms. To the extent that management lawyers are partic-
ipating in these arbitrations, they are introducing all of the worst of
the court processes that inflate the cost-large briefs, long records, big
speeches-and certainly are eliminating any hope that it is going to be
fast or cheap.
As to fair, I'm not sure you need three arbitrators. Maybe that's
what people think looks fair; but, I certainly think you have to give the
participants a little better shot at knowing who their arbitrator is and a
little greater participation in the selection process. I am not sure we
can afford in this area to permit your arbitrators the luxury of no opin-
ion. If they are dealing with people's lives and their answer is zero, I
don't know what sense of fairness any participant comes away with.
You might consider, and I offer this as a final observation, where
there are statutory rules that are being considered in an arbitration
process, what different approaches have been used. I know the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission wouldn't consider delegating to an
arbitrator any of its authority, not a fingernail, although some of the
185. The logo of the American Arbitration Association formerly included the
words, "Economy," "Justice" and "Speed."
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same issues arise before the SEC as will come up in your securities
arbitrations. On the other hand, the National Labor Relations Board,
which has similar statutory structure, deals very differently with arbi-
trations. Somebody's fired; he complains that he got fired because of
union activity. There is a union contract. There is a charge filed with
the NLRB. There is an arbitration demand filed by a union. Same
issue, essentially. The NLRB will defer. It will, what they call, "Col-
lyer" the case.'86 And they'll wait and see the outcome of the
arbitration.
I'm not suggesting that this is what you are going to ask our legisla-
tors to consider, but all of these are areas that I suggest have gone
unexplored in this rush to create a system to catch up with the
Supreme Court's dumping on you a responsibility for which you were
not prepared. To the extent that you have risen to try to adjust to the
demand, I compliment you. To the extent you leave it where it is, I
deplore it.
MR. ROGERS: Well, I am a management lawyer, and despite
Judith Vladeck's warning, I hope you will hear my advice and possibly
take some of it.
I do agree with Judith that the New York Stock Exchange has re-
ceived a bum rap. I believe there has been a well-orchestrated public
relations campaign over the course of the last nine or ten months
against arbitration of employment discrimination claims. I think it has
been unfair and I think the motives of many of the people who are
behind it are quite suspect.
What I'd like to do today is address first the overriding question:
Should the New York Stock Exchange and other self-regulatory orga-
nizations arbitrate employment disputes? I think you will guess my
answer, but I will give it to you anyway: emphatically yes. And sec-
ond, moving past that: How does the arbitration process currently
work, and what about the criticisms that have been so bruited about?
The New York Stock Exchange arbitration facility in particular (and
the same can certainly be said of the National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers ("NASD") and the other self-regulatory organization ar-
bitration facilities) is well established, is sophisticated, and, I believe,
provides a tremendous service to member firms and registered repre-
sentatives in all fields.
I do not believe that the Exchange needs to worry about Judith
Vladeck's assertion that it is charged with policing the statutory
framework of employment discrimination law. That is not the Ex-
change's role and the Supreme Court never meant to dump anything
like that on it.
186. The NLRB "Collyers" a case when it defers to the decision of an arbitrator or
an arbitration panel The Board may dismiss a complaint it is otherwise permitted to
hear if it advances the policies of the National Labor Relations Act. See Coliyer Insu-
lated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 839-41 (1971).
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What the Exchange's arbitration facility does, and I believe does
well, is consider and resolve individual claims-employment claims.
It has considered employment claims for years. What's new, in light
of the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer' 7 in 1991, is the considera-
tion of employment discrimination claims. The General Accounting
Office's March 1994 report on securities arbitration, about which I'm
sure many here are familiar, noted, for example, that in 1991 and 1992
the New York Stock Exchange arbitrated 312 employment cases, and
only sixteen of those were discrimination cases.'88
In other words, this arbitration facility is well versed in deciding
claims of employees against their employers. In the past they may
have been claims for bonuses that weren't paid or for unfair firing or
for some other issue unrelated to discrimination. Now the Exchange
is determining employment discrimination claims.
One of the reasons that I think it is so vital for the Exchange and
the other self-regulatory organizations to continue their good work in
arbitration, including arbitration of employment discrimination
claims, is that the court system is broken.
Page one of today's New York Tunes reports on the U.S. Judicial
Conference's recommendations that employment discrimination
claims somehow be thrown out of the federal courts or at least be
subject to some preliminary screening by the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission. 18 9
The federal judges realize that they cannot handle the tidal wave of
employment discrimination claims. Their suggestion that the EEOC
handle it is a difficult one to fathom because those of us with experi-
ence with the EEOC know that they're swamped and what they're
doing is trying to shuttle cases over to the federal courts.
The Dunlop Commission, the commission formed by the current
administration to consider worker-management relations, issued a
fact-finding report in May of 1994.190 In chapter four of that report,
there was a very interesting and fair consideration of employment reg-
ulation, litigation, and dispute resolution.
A number of things that the Dunlop Commission found about liti-
gation underscores how arbitration plays a vital role both for the
member firms and for their employees and how it is in both their in-
terests. A number of the Commission's findings that I think under-
187. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
188. General Accounting Office, Health, Education and Human Services Division,
GAO/HEHS-94-17 Employment Discrimination: How Registered Representatives
Fare in Discrimination Disputes (March 30, 1994) at 7 [hereinafter 1994 GAO
Report].
189. Robert Pear, Judges Proposing to Narrow Access to Federal Court, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 5, 1994, at 1.
190. U.S. Departments of Labor and Commerce, Commission on the Future of
Worker-Management Relations, Fact Finding Report (May 1994) (on file with the
Fordham Law Review).
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score this fact are as follows: the report found that litigation is
expensive and that complicated court processes make it difficult for
employees to pursue claims;' 9 ' the report also found that from 1971 to
1991 the overall number of civil cases brought in federal court had
risen by 110%, but the number of employment claims rose by
430%. 1' And those figures are from before the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act and the 1991 Civil Rights Act became effective, so by now,
presumably, the increase in discrimination cases is much larger.
As for costs, the Commission found that substantially over one dol-
lar in costs, attorneys' fees, and other just wasted money is spent for
each one dollar that goes to a claimant in compensation for a court
finding of discrimination.193 The Commission found that the costs, the
difficulty, and the complication of employment litigation ultimately
restrict litigation to upper-level professionals, usually complaining of
their termination. 194
Jury verdicts, the Commission noted, are often lottery-like in their
results.195 The problem of unpredictable jury decisions is one that
everyone seems to be considering these days. Last night on the eleven
o'clock news, I saw a report that the City of New York is going to
propose some way whereby claims against the City could be deter-
mined in a forum without a jury.
In other words, the current litigation process is just broken. As
Judith Vladeck noted, arbitrators can secure significant savings in time
and significant savings in overall difficulty for everyone. I submit that
there is no reason to treat employment discrimination arbitration dif-
ferently from the other disputes the arbitration department handles.
Arbitrators are well able to handle discrimination claims.
One issue that wasn't raised by Judith Vladeck, but is often raised
by critics of arbitration, is that with the way that the U-4 form" is
constructed, the employee must bring claims in arbitration. The
Dunlop Commission itself, in its report, noted that fact and noted that
other industries as well are implementing pre-dispute arbitration
agreements requiring arbitration of disputes. It stated that voluntari-
ness of arbitration was not that significant to it in considering whether
arbitration is a worthwhile forum.' 91 It noted that the courts aren't
191. 1l at 105.
192. Id. at 111-12.
193. Id. at 109-10.
194. Id. at 112-13.
195. Id. at 113.
196. Form U-4, Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or
Transfer.
197. "The fact that employment arbitration is not a particularly voluntary proce-
dure as far as individual employees are concerned is not a sufficient reason for re-
jecting this option. The alternative of litigation in court or before an administrative
tribunal is hardly voluntary either." U.S. Departments of Labor and Commerce,
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, Fact Finding Report
118 (May 1994). But see Peter F. Blackman, Arbitration Suit Asserts Constitutional
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particularly voluntary either.198 If you don't have an arbitration facil-
ity or agreement with your opponent then you are relegated to courts
whether you like it or not.
Also, of course, one must keep in mind with respect to New York
Stock Exchange arbitration, the structure of the rules is such that if it
were any other way the employee would have an option that the em-
ployer does not. Member firms, by the rules, are obligated to arbi-
trate claims brought by employees whether they want to or not.199
The fact is that employers will continue increasing their use of arbi-
tration. Even if the Exchange were to decide to get out of employ-
ment discrimination arbitration, companies and industries that don't
have an arbitration facility with this sophistication, with this ability,
are entering into agreements requiring arbitration with their employ-
ees and will continue doing so. Arbitration is something that is the
wave of the present and the future, and I think it would be extremely
short-sighted for the Exchange to get out of that business.
Now, I want to address a few of the specific criticisms that have
been raised against arbitration of employment discrimination claims.
First, it is often claimed that arbitrators have no training in employ-
ment law. That's wrong. The NYSE does train arbitrators in the law.
The NASD, I know, does an excellent job in its training efforts. This
is a point of personal interest to me. Pearl Zuchlewski, a plaintiff's
lawyer who is here today, and I, with Jay Waks, who's also here, under
the auspices of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
offered a training program for hundreds of arbitrators last year. The
result was, in the words of the Securities Arbitration Commentator,
"commendably objective. ' 200
But let's go beyond the fact that training is offered and try to under-
stand how significant the issue of training is.201 Although it is against
my interests to say this, because I do a lot of work in employment
discrimination, employment discrimination law is not rocket science.
It is an area of law that smart people can understand.
Those who criticize the supposed lack of legal training by arbitra-
tors ignore the fact that juries have no training in discrimination law,
and there is no reason to suppose that a judge's instruction to a jury
concerning the law leaves the jury any more informed on these issues
than arbitrators who have received some training and have the benefit
of the competing arguments and evidence submitted by counsel. In
Arguments, Nat'l LJ., Feb. 27, 1995, at B1 (discussing a suit, filed in federal court in
San Francisco, which alleges that compulsory arbitration forces employees to give up
their due process and jury trial rights).
198. Il
199. NYSE Rules, supra note 14, Rule 600(a), 2600.
200. Arbitrator Training: Employment Law Seminar, Sec. Arb. Commentator, June
1993, at 8.
201. For a full discussion of arbitrator training, see infra pp. 1679-94.
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short, I don't believe that discrimination law presents any more com-
plications than other legal claims that have been handled here in arbi-
tration successfully for years.
The second criticism that's been raised in this ongoing P.R. cam-
paign against arbitration is that arbitration rules are unfair to employ-
ees. That's wrong again. The New York Stock Exchange bends over
backwards to afford employees an opportunity to present their case.
Except for depositions, which are only rarely used in this forum, the
full panoply of document discovery and of interrogatories, so-called
questions to the other side, is used. In my personal experience dealing
with discovery disputes,' when one side claims that the other side's
requests are too broad or out of bounds, the Exchange has been, if
anything, erring on the side of giving the claimant more information
than reasonably could be considered useful.
Other arbitration rules that operate, I believe, to create an effective
mechanism for resolving these disputes, include the rule that the strict
rules of evidence used by the courts do not apply.M3 I believe that this
ultimately works more to the benefit of the employee than the em-
ployer because it allows the employees to put before the arbitrators all
manner of evidence that would never see the light of day in court.
Perhaps most important for employees, arbitrators only very rarely
dismiss cases before the hearing. In court, employers can more read-
ily obtain pretrial dismissal of meritless claims. In arbitration, em-
ployees get to have their "day in court," and sometimes prevail, in
cases that likely never would have survived in court.
Another criticism that has been leveled is that the arbitrators are
from the securities industry and biased against employees. Now, this
has been one of the most oft-repeated criticisms, but I think, probably,
this is one that the people in this room know is most incorrect. The
fact is that ordinarily, of the three persons on an arbitration panel, two
are public, having no connection to the industry or obviously, to the
parties. The third arbitrator, who is from the industry, cannot come
from the firm involved in the case, and, like all arbitrators, must dis-
close any circumstances that might preclude the arbitrator from ren-
dering an objective and impartial determination.
The fact that one impartial arbitrator knows something about how
the securities industry works actually benefits all parties, because
these cases brought by securities industry employees often deal with
the intricacies of how individuals do very complex jobs, and the fact
that one person may know something about how those jobs are done,
I think works to the benefit of all concerned.
202. For a full discussion of discovery, see supra pp. 1551-70.
203. Uniform Code, supra note 14, § 21, at 18; NYSE Rules, supra note 14, Rule
620, 1 2620.
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Finally, of course, each party has the unlimited right to challenge
the selection of any arbitrator for cause, as well as the right to make
one peremptory challenge, removing an arbitrator without having to
give a reason.
Another criticism constantly raised is the notion that the arbitrators
are all older, white men. In my experience, that's not true. I think the
concept of "demographic incorrectness" is one that is often thrown
out without any real substantive or legitimate explanation as to its
importance. I believe that it is just "bean counting," plain and simple.
But most importantly, in my personal experience with the Exchange
and with the NASD, I see that it's not true.
Finally, another subtext that underlies all of the criticism of arbitra-
tion is the claim that employees cannot win. Mr. Clemente may have
more accurate or more updated statistics, but the ones I have prove
this is just not right. The GAO report from March of 1994 studied
eighteen cases that went to a decision, and of those the claimant won
in ten of them.2° A fifty-five percent success rate for claimants is not
evidence of a biased forum. Now, some may try to minimize that sub-
stantial success by claimants by stating that a number of the winning
employees may have wanted more than they even got. But I don't
think that's anything that distinguishes arbitration from any other liti-
gation forum.
The short of it is that the criticisms of arbitration are readily rebut-
ted. I can speak from current and personal experience. At the mo-
ment I'm involved in a very lengthy employment discrimination
hearing, although it is no more lengthy than it would be in court. The
hearing started this fall, approximately a year after the statement of
claim was filed, which is substantially quicker than it could ever have
gotten done in court. The prehearing discovery process was extremely
fair and well run by the chair of the arbitration panel, who is a woman,
I might note. I can attest to you that there is nothing about this pro-
cess that is pro-employer. I've had my frustrations in this current
hearing as well as others.
Professor Katsoris, very kindly, when he first identified me early on,
said I've successfully represented management in this forum. Unfor-
tunately, sometimes I have unsuccessfully represented management in
this forum. It is not one that's just one-sided.
As to advice to improve the process, I believe, that there is some
use in considering, or encouraging arbitrators to consider, the possibil-
ity of some prehearing motions and possibly the use of directed ver-
dicts. There are claims that are meritless-the claimant has put on his
or her case and it clearly has no merit, it does not seem particularly
productive to go forward. I know that sometimes the arbitrators have
204. See 1994 GAO Report, supra note 188, at 2.
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decided cases at that point, but in my personal experience, sometimes
they have decided not to.
I think that it very much merits your serious consideration as to
whether you encourage arbitrators to make written decisions. Judith
Vladeck used the example of someone getting a zero dollar result, and
discussed whether that person should be entitled to get a statement of
reasons. From my own perspective on the management side, I think
there's some merit to written decisions for another reason.
If I represent a company that has been charged with nothing but
discrimination-in other words, there aren't some tag-along claims of
breach of contract or something unrelated to discrimination-and if
the arbitrators at the end of the day decide, as sometimes they do, that
although they don't really see that there was any discrimination, they
think that overall the claimant is entitled to some amount of money,
and if the arbitrators give that claimant one dollar, and I don't have a
statement of why they gave that one dollar, then there is substantial
damage to my client because it might be assumed, incorrectly, that the
arbitrators found discrimination existed.
I have personal experience of how seriously committed many of the
companies who are members of this Exchange are to equal employ-
ment opportunity. It is very personal and hurtful to be charged with
discrimination. And it is certainly a black mark on your record if you
are found liable for it. So, in other words, I do concur with Judith
Vladeck that there is something to be said for encouraging arbitrators
to write opinions.
In sum, the trend these days is toward arbitration throughout the
country for all the right reasons. Congress has endorsed arbitration.
In the 1991 Civil Rights Act it included a provision encouraging the
use of arbitration."5 The Dunlop Commission is very seriously con-
sidering arbitration. Its findings in that regard are quite interesting.
And throughout the United States, industries are trying to implement
it. Here, you've got it, and I believe you ought to nurture it and pro-
tect it.
One other bill that's of interest is worth noting. There was a men-
tion by Professor Coffee of the Republican bill, the Common Sense
Legal Reform Act.2" There was a another bill introduced by Senator
Danforth at the end of this past term-obviously he won't be reintro-
ducing it since he has retired, but I believe it will be introduced-that
would amend Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act, and the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, to require that before a case goes to a law-
205. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 118, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (1991)
(amending several sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993)).
206. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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suit, if the defendant demands mediation (and mediation is in a sense
regulated settlement talks), then some mediation should take place.20 7
I don't know what will happen with that bill, but it again is evidence
of the fact that people understand that the court process is broken and
that when you have a good facility for resolving these things, you
should use it.
The standard stated a few minutes ago by Judith Vladeck was that
you should have a process that's fast, cheap, and fair. In my experi-
ence, this forum has very substantially met those goals. Obviously
nothing's perfect and obviously improvements can be considered.
Thank you.
Discussion
PROF. KATSORIS: Thank you, Ted. Before throwing it open for
comments, I'd like to ask Judith a couple of questions, playing my role
of devil's advocate.
The mistrust of arbitration was, to some extent, an underlying basis
of why the Wilko20 8 Court felt that '33 Act209 cases should not be
forced into arbitration. We've come a long way since then. You men-
tioned that these discrimination claims don't belong in arbitration. Is
your basic criticism that they don't belong in self-regulatory organiza-
tion arbitration specifically, or in arbitration generally? In other
words, do you have the same apprehension as to the AAA as you do
with SRO arbitration of these discrimination claims?
The second question is, if they do stay in SRO arbitration, how
could we improve the system to satisfy you more?
Better training of arbitrators is obviously one improvement. Maybe
written opinions or decisions would be another thing. How about the
method of selection of arbitrators?
I have no objection to the way the SROs are presently selecting
arbitrators in securities cases,2 10 but there are different ways of select-
ing panels. For example, at the AAA each party gets a list of arbitra-
tors that they pick from.2 ' Would that make you more comfortable
in SRO employment cases? We could possibly experiment with that,
as a pilot program, as a means of improving your image of fairness in
such cases.
207. Employment Dispute Resolution Act of 1994, S. 2327, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994) (introduced by Sen. Danforth). A companion bill, H.R. 2016, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess (1994), was introduced in the House by Rep. Gunderson. Rep. Gunderson's staff
has indicated that he intends to reintroduce the measure in the 104th Congress.
208. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
209. Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1933).
210. See NYSE Rules, supra note 14, Rules 607-11, 1[ 2607-11.
211. See, e.g., American Arbitration Association, Securities Arbitration Rules § 14,
AAA164-20M-4/93, available in WESTLAW, 1993 WL 495385, at *7 (giving each
party to a dispute 20 days in which to strike from a list of arbitrators any names
objected to and to number the remaining names in order of preference).
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MS. VLADECK: I didn't say, and I would not say, that discrimina-
tion issues should never be submitted to arbitration. In the first place,
I totally approve, support, and for years have worked for the adoption
of consensual arbitration, where parties say this is what they want.
They have a certain level of equality in making a selection of a pro-
cess. I am talking about mandatory arbitration, and I'm talking about
employment and one's life, where people should not be required to
abandon all hope, ye who enter. Forgive me if I have mangled that.
But do you realize what you've heard today? You've heard a man-
agement lawyer saying rah, rah, rah, this is good. Why is it so good?
Because employees who submit to this process don't know what
they're getting, if anything. If they win and it is determined that
something wrong has been done, they don't get their attorneys' fees,
they don't get the kinds of damages that the law says they're entitled
to. Why?
If I take a woman into the federal court who has a legitimate, meri-
torious case of discrimination, she is entitled to certain protection, she
is entitled to a fair hearing, entitled to due process. If she wins, she
gets whatever money she's lost in back wages,212 she gets enough in
attorneys' fees so that she nets whatever it is of the damages pro-
vided,213 and if she has suffered emotional distress, under the Act she
can get damages for that.214 Go into arbitration, even if you win they
give you, say, twenty dollars with no explanation, no attorneys' fees,
no compensation for emotional distress.
Why are the people in this industry deprived of statutory benefits?
Because they have chosen to work here in this industry? You're giv-
ing them so much? Well, come on, give them something more. If
you're asking them to give up statutory rights for the privilege of
working for you, then give them something as a quid pro quo. What
are you offering them? Some add-on to their pay? So, the answer is, I
think, arbitration of discrimination cases today, as it is handled by the
SROs, is unfortunate and deprives workers in this industry of fair
treatment.
Let me ask you all: How ready are you to let all of your IRS mat-
ters be arbitrated? The IRS doesn't like some filing that you've done.
It gives it to an arbitrator. You don't get to pick. You don't get to
choose. The arbitrator doesn't have to be bound by the law. He
thinks you earn too damn much money anyway. Not only don't you
get a refund, but you get a penalty imposed with no explanation and
no right to appeal. What are we doing with our public rights, giving
them to untrained arbitrators? Do you really want to do that with
212. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
213. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
214. Congress amended Title VII with the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to provide for
actual damages beyond backpay and restoration of position. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(g)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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major pieces of your life? You know, you could be there some day.
This is not simply for women who complain of sexual harassment. It's
for executives, too, who have been cheated.
Once upon a time, your industry was one where a handshake was
enough or where a word was enough, where you could trust totally
your counterpart in another one of the houses, or if you came to work
and you were told you're going to get a guaranteed bonus next year of
X, you didn't need it in writing.
You know what you've got? You've got arbitrators who have gone
nuts. Now they are hearing statute of frauds issues and getting all
smart about having things in writing, but they won't get smart about
the discrimination law. Why? I think they have not heard anybody
tell them that the member firms really care, that this is the law, that
the firms care about it, and that they are protecting the industry by
putting an end to any discrimination that's going to create workplace
problems.
PROF. KATSORIS: Before you leave the first question and get to
the second one I merely wish to point out that the Supreme Court has
recently, I think last week, granted certiorari on the issue of taxability
of these awards.215 If they become tax free, won't that magnify their
value?
MS. VLADECK: That's correct.
PROF. KATSORIS: Perhaps my next question is out of pure igno-
rance, because I'm not an expert in this area. Indeed, the only time I
was put on a panel in a discrimination case-an age discrimination
case-for some reason I was challenged peremptorily. I don't know
why.
Here's my question: Suppose another industry-for example, tele-
communications-puts into their employment agreements that any
disputes would be arbitrated before the AAA. Would you have simi-
lar objections?
MS. VLADECK: I would have a problem if that were made a con-
dition for hire, that we won't give you a job unless you sign away your
public rights. I have trouble with that. I don't think any citizen
should have to give up or waive his/her constitutional rights if he/she
goes to work in government, or waive his/her statutory protection if
he/she goes into private employment. I hope we're not there yet.
PROF. KATSORIS: Let's move on to my next question. Assuming
discrimination cases in the securities industry are going to stay here at
the SRO level, how can we improve the process-particularly in the
method of selection of arbitrators? Would you experiment with that,
215. Schleier v. Commissioner, 26 F.3d 1119, (5th Cir.) cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 507
(1994). For a detailed consideration of the taxability of damages for personal injury,
see Douglas A. Kahn, Compensatory and Punitive Damages for a Personal Injury: To
Tax or Not To Tax, 2 Fla. Tax Rev. 327 (1995).
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at least in these cases? Would that satisfy you a little bit? Would you
be willing to look into an alternative way of selecting arbitrators in
discrimination cases?
MS. VLADECK: Absolutely. You know, it really is a perception
of fairness as well as the actual fairness. It is very hard to judge fair-
ness. But you are going to feel better if you have an arbitrator who is
prepared to listen to your legal arguments, who is prepared to hear
them, who is prepared to act as if he's heard this stuff before. It would
go a long way to making you feel, well, "Maybe I'm not in the wrong
place after all."
PROF. KATSORIS: So, you would prefer the system of choosing
from a list?
MS. VLADECK: I would prefer a system of choosing from a list of
people who have had some association with this subject before or who
have had a training course and gotten some certification. It doesn't
have to be long.
The one point I agree on with Ted is that you don't have to be a
rocket scientist to understand this. He and I engage in this on a regu-
lar basis and neither of us claims that kind of scientific expertise.
I think we could, with a week of concentrated time, convey to the
arbitrators the fundamental principles. And then we would tell them,
don't do this unless you are willing to accept from the parties some
summary of the law that will guide you when you listen to the evi-
dence and when you come to your decision.
MS. ZUCHLEWSKI: I was a participant in the training program
that Ted Rogers referred to; we did it under the auspices of the Asso-
ciation of the Bar of the City of New York with Jay Waks, and I would
like to comment on two issues.
First, having represented individuals, I would like to talk to you
about what those people say to me when they come in, because I think
you might want to hear it. And second, I want to tell you my impres-
sions of having done that arbitrator training program.
First, as to the individuals who are seeking representation, they are
angry and they are frightened. They are angry because they feel that
they have been closed out of the opportunity to go to a judicial pro-
ceeding. Not necessarily, as Mrs. Vladeck was saying, because they
don't want to consider mediation, arbitration, or other alternate dis-
pute resolution processes. But when they are in my office and they
say they have signed a U-4, and I reply then you can forget about that
jury trial, that is something that just hits them in the gut.
They also are afraid. They've just had something very adverse hap-
pen in this industry, or they believe something very adverse has hap-
pened, and then they learn that the arbitrators who are going to
decide their claims are coming from that industry. That does not give
them a feeling of confidence.
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Ted and I, I think, are commendably objective when we do our pro-
grams, but I want to respond to his comment about "bean counting"
and about the arbitrators being well-versed. If the individuals who
have to go before those arbitrators don't feel that the arbitrators are
well-versed, I think it's something that the Exchange should be con-
cerned about, because I think the perception of fairness in many ways
is as important as the actual fairness itself.
Those are the comments I wanted to make about the claimants.
The comments I want to make about the arbitrators are as follows.
I think Mrs. Vladeck is absolutely right, that these arbitrators were at
sea when Gilmer2 16 came down, and I find, after having done the
training programs both at the NASD and the New York Stock Ex-
change with Ted and Jay, that the arbitrators appreciate that.
When we started the programs at the NASD, I believe everyone
was surprised at the turnout and the interest in the programs. I think
the arbitrators well appreciate that they don't know these areas and
that they're very concerned about it, and as thorough as Ted and Jay
and I try to be, we had two hours to do all of employment law.
Now, it might not take a rocket scientist to decide these issues, but I
have spent a considerable number of years and amount of effort trying
to learn this field. I don't think any of us can fairly say that as thor-
ough and objective as we may have been, we even scratched the sur-
face in two hours.
As a matter of fact, what we spent a lot of our time doing was tell-
ing the arbitrators when to ask for briefs on legal issues. That is not
going to contribute to arbitration being fast or cheap if we are spend-
ing a lot of our time briefing and rebriefing issues for arbitrators.
So, what I was hoping to convey today is that there is a real concern
among the individuals who are employed in your industry about these
mandatory procedures. There is a perception that they are suspect.
And I really urge you to consider policies or procedures to address
those perceptions and also to address the questions your own arbitra-
tors have, because I think that your arbitrators are very concerned
about their ability and their capacity to deal with these issues that
most of them didn't have any inkling they'd even have to address
when they became arbitrators.
PROF. KATSORIS: I am proud to say, Pearl, that I was one of
your's and Ted's students at one of these discrimination training ses-
sions. I think it was an excellent presentation. But once again, it just
did begin the discussion. Regardless of all that excellent training,
however, I was still challenged peremptorily when appointed as an
arbitrator in my one and only age discrimination case. I guess I need
more training.
216. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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MR. CELLA: For seventeen years, we at SICA have grappled with
this problem vis-a-vis public securities customers. McMahon,2" which
was merely a device for the Supreme Court to clean out the federal
system of public customer claims, was the harbinger of what's happen-
ing now and what will continue to happen. The explosion of cases
added arbitrators with intelligence and education and background to
the panels who knew very little, if anything, about securities issues.
Now you have issues that have exploded, that are brought to arbi-
tration, for example, RICO.21 Lawyers who practice criminal law in
many cases are not entirely clear about how RICO should be applied.
I include myself.
You have matters arcane in nature-derivatives. You have matters
far beyond the competence of many lawyers that are thrown on the
table in front of arbitrators, and the answer generally is, well, we must
train them better. Well, arbitration is not going to be fast, cheap, and
fair, if it is now, and I doubt even that. It won't be in the future.
Check your legal costs pre-McMahon and look at them now vis-a-vis
your costs in arbitration.
Labor law, for those who don't do it, is complicated. You may not
have to be a rocket scientist, but you have to spend time. Where are
our securities industry arbitrators drawn from across the United
States? They are generally of professional background and they're
working full time to earn a living.
Now, that creates a problem in scheduling alone, but more signifi-
cantly, how much time do they have to devote to training in issues
relating to securities arbitration, much less labor law employment
problems? This is very difficult.
A few sessions where highly experienced labor law attorneys pro-
vide a lecture that is extremely limited perforce and may narrow down
to a lesson on when to ask for briefs, which are about the only helpful
tool in arcane issues that arbitrators have, is not going to produce a
body of arbitrators that are skilled in labor law matters.
Moreover, as more and more is dumped into arbitration or, as Pro-
fessor Coffee suggested or indicated where the trend is going-the
subparts (mediation, conciliation, settlement discussions)-you are
going to find this system more stressed.
And the cost of the system to the major SROs, the New York Stock
Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers, which is
hardly cheap at the moment, will continue to grow. And the cost of
competent arbitrators and their training will continue to grow. And
the problem of training is a very difficult one, as I say, considering
from where you draw your vast numbers of arbitrators.
217. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
218. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988
& Supp. IV 1992).
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You can't make this a system of retired persons getting a day's
work. And I'm not knocking retired senior citizens because regretta-
bly I am almost there. But the real fact to be faced is that there are
people who would like to have a lunch with two other nice people and
honestly try to decide issues that have grown so far out of hand com-
pared to the pre-McMahon issues that have to be addressed in cus-
tomer arbitration, and I'm afraid it exceeds their competence or
indeed their good will.
This may lead to consideration of perhaps a separate arbitrator sec-
tion devoted to labor matters. That might require selecting a group
from the list of active employed persons that make up the panels of
arbitrators, having them submit to an intensive week of training, at the
expense of the exchanges, perhaps at a location away from their em-
ployment, away from the city, where volunteers, highly skilled, will
provide materials and lecture.
Now, that's not going to be easy, but short of that you are throwing
another layer of complex issues on securities issues that are already
complex, and the mix leads to results that are not fair. The playing
field is not only not level; it is skewed with boulders. And this is a
problem that you aptly perceive, but I tell you the system now is
stressed. I question the rationale of decisions that I see coming out of
the system. And I speak at the moment not as pro-claimant or pro-
industry. I am from the private sector.
I see arbitration becoming another failed c6urt system. And you
cannot fight the federal courts and the federal government. If the
trend is to wipe out of the system all those matters which we deem not
to be appropriate for the dignity of our federal courts, and that might
include torts as well, then it will make this industry arbitration system
a failure-a failure at great expense to operate and a failure in the
results it produces for both claimants and respondents. This is a very
serious matter.
MR. ROGERS: Just briefly. I've spoken enough, but I can't help
myself. I think it is important to get back to what the goal is here.
This arbitration department, this process that you put together, as Mr.
Celia noted, early on dealt with customer and firm disputes. It pro-
vided a way for fast and effective resolution of those disputes, rather
than having both customers and firms bogged down in litigation.
Now, employer-employee disputes present another area where a
real service is provided to all parties by providing for resolution of
disputes effectively. And again, the great majority of these employer-
employee disputes to date have been things having nothing to do with
discrimination. I would be interested if there are any statistics from
either the NASD or the New York Stock Exchange as to what has
happened since Gilmer, because I think, in one sense, the problem
should not be overstated.
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There are many discrimination claims nationwide, but in the securi-
ties industry, in arbitration, I don't know what rise there has been in
the numbers. As I mentioned with that GAO report, as of 1992, only
eighteen have gone to decision.219
If you have an effective mechanism for both the member firms and
their personnel to resolve disputes, employment matters fit hand-in-
glove with the customer-firm issues as things that really should be ad-
dressed and should be taken care of by that mechanism, rather than
relegating people to the courts.
MR. WAKS: Just by way of background, I'm currently, in my spare
time, chairing the Employment Disputes Committee of the Center for
Public Resources Institute for Dispute Resolution, where we're draft-
ing and updating private models or models produced for corporations
of pre-dispute mediation arbitration procedures. Our committee is
working on the assumption that we are at the crossroads in dispute
resolution and alternative dispute resolution.
A small but growing number of corporations of all sizes are adopt-
ing these mechanisms internally for the resolution of disputes, be they
of employment discrimination variety or other types relating to the
employment setting.
Further, by way of background, surprisingly, despite my advocacy
exclusively on behalf of corporate clients, I have been chosen as an
arbitrator and mediator in employment disputes, both through the
AAA as well as the District of New Jersey. It is an interesting experi-
ence. I do believe my experience, while not as considerable as
Judith's, did serve the parties well in resolving both of those disputes.
The critical issue, and I think Judy put her finger on it, is the accept-
ability of both the procedures and those who are chosen as arbitrators.
I think that we must not lose sight of that in deciding what improve-
ments, if any, the Exchange or the NASD should take into account.
And I have some suggestions in that regard having listened to you this
morning.
First, I think that the Exchange should consider adopting proce-
dures addressed exclusively to employment disputes. Part of the rea-
son is that there is some confusion when you are dealing with
procedures that have been adopted for other types of disputes, cus-
tomer disputes by and large, or interfirm disputes, and part of the rea-
son is for the reason that Pearl Zuchlewski mentioned earlier, the
reason of acceptability and concern of clients, on both sides of the
table, about what they are getting into.
As part of that, I think there should be a formalization of a media-
tion alternative offered by the Exchange. It is not extraordinary. As I
219. See 1994 GAO Report, supra note 188, at 2. This figure represents disputes
decided at the NASD's New York City office and at the NYSE between August 1990
and December 1992. Id.
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said, corporations are now considering adopting formal policies on
mediation. The major advantage is to avoid what I call the win factor.
Certainly, both management and plaintiffs' counsel are loathe to even
propose mediation, figuring that it might signal some weakness in
their position. And I think it serves, perhaps more than arbitration,
the opportunity to resolve disputes in a fair and equitable way to both
sides that will lessen the case load, both in the courts and before the
EEOC, as well as the stock exchanges.
Secondly, with respect to arbitration, I happen to agree with Judy
vigorously that there should be an opinion written in employment dis-
putes, particularly if issues of law are being debated. I think-Judy,
correct me if I am wrong-but in your eloquence, the one reference
you did not make is to the acceptability of labor arbitration and the
role it's played throughout the dispute. You mentioned it, but I just
wanted to emphasize it, I guess, that labor arbitrators who by and
large were not governed by a lot of law except the law of the work-
place-the euphemistic law of the workplace-got acceptability for
their awards by writing an opinion that explained the positions of both
sides and why they were awarding the way they did.
I think it is extremely important in the employment law setting that
this be carried over to the nonunion aspect of working lfife-especially
where employment law is at issue, as well as what's fair and just in the
workplace.
Third, I think the training of arbitrators is essential, and the certifi-
cation of arbitrators trained in employment law is essential. I'm not
sure how practical it will be to expect arbitrators who wish to function
in this area to take on a day, two-day, or even a week's course in
employment law training. Maybe it is. I haven't reflected on that suf-
ficiently, but I would like to suggest that the Exchange maintain a
select panel comprised, at least in part, of attorneys with considerable
experience in employment law.
I also agree with Judy that there should be a different methodology
for choosing an arbitrator. One that gives more appearance, at least
appearance, if not in actuality, to the prospect of having the parties,
through their representatives or on their own, have an actual choice-
the way the American Arbitration Association does it, with a list of
arbitrators from which you can strike.
In terms of the demographics, while I'm talking about the choice of
arbitrators, I think one need only refer to, and I guess I'm falling into
the trap of looking at but one example, Judge Wood's decision in the
case that Ted so ably litigated last year, Flynn v. Goldman Sachs,
Co.,22° to see that a woman is most capable of adjudicating a sex dis-
220. 836 F. Supp. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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crimination claim brought on behalf of a woman, one where a jury
disagreed with the judge vigorously. 2 '
I happen to agree with Ted, that I really see no reason to believe
that a male judge cannot adjudicate a claim of discrimination by a
woman and why a white cannot adjudicate a claim raised by an Afri-
can-American, and so on. It is not part of our judicial system to assign
judges on the base of ethnicity, race, or gender. I see no reason to
assume that it has to be done in the arbitration forum either.
I believe that the arbitrators should ultimately, and this should be
spelled out in the rules, have the authority and the responsibility to
adhere to points of substantive law, of substantive employment law,
that are raised during the course of a proceeding before the Exchange,
similar to that of a judge in court addressing the same claim. That
means that if the judge does not believe that the law is fair, the judge
nevertheless will enforce the law as written. And so, too, an arbitrator
should be expected to adhere to that principle.
Similarly, an arbitrator should maintain a knowledge of the law and
should administer the law in the same way that a judge would with
respect to discrimination claims. So, regardless of what he may feel or
she may feel about the work of a particular claimant, if that claimant
is entitled to an award of damages under the law, be it compensatory
or punitive damages, then that award should be rendered.
I have one other point that is sort of a pet peeve. It goes to some-
thing Ted said earlier, which is that perhaps the biggest miscarriage of
justice-and I think this is true not just in terms of my role as corpo-
rate counsel-is the inability to get cases in the securities arbitration
forum considered for dismissal on the law, based in the nature of a
motion for summary judgment or directed verdict, as you would in
court.
While Ted mentioned it in terms of pointing to the fairness of the
process, I mention it in terms of giving counsel an opportunity to dis-
cuss with claimant, at the beginning, the commencement of that pro-
cess, as to whether that process should take place.
I think that some of the publicity that has been given to the securi-
ties industry arbitration handling of employment disputes, particularly
discrimination disputes, results from an impression that securities in-
dustry firms seem to win. Ted, I think, through his use of statistics,
dispels that notion. But without regard to statistics, I think in many
cases it results from a careful culling of cases to be taken to arbitration
as one would in court.
You just don't take every case to court. And if you can see that on
the law you are not going to prevail, you are not going to be able to
present that case to either a jury in court or to the arbitrators on the
221. Judge Kimba M. Wood reversed the jury's decision in favor of the plaintiff as
being unsupported by the evidence. Id at 158-64.
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merits, you just figure out some other way to resolve that claim, short
of wasting everyone's time, everyone's money, and the operations and
resources of the New York Stock Exchange.
I would like to point out a fact, which someone said earlier, that the
EEOC, which is looking to foist its case load on the courts while the
courts are looking to do similarly to the EEOC, currently has an esti-
mated 97,000 cases backlogged at the end of this year.222 The new
Chairman of the EEOC, as you may have seen in the news report last
week, has called for greater reliance on mediation and arbitration to
resolve these disputes. And I think it's just one more expert opinion
that demonstrates the importance of arbitration and, hopefully, medi-
ation in the securities industry.' 2
PROF. KATSORIS: Before we continue with comments, the issue
of numbers has come up, and I would like to ask Rick Ryder, Debbie
Masucci, and Bob Clemente what their experience is with the number
of cases they have seen, and in reporting on or administering these
cases, do they have any particular comments?
MR. RYDER: Well, we see the cases that come out of the system,
so we're looking on the other end of the process, and, so far, there
have been relatively few awards that have come out. There have been
some notable awards recently, and I'm not sure what that says about
arbitrators getting more acclimated to this kind of claim, but still the
numbers are fairly small. On the filings, it may be much larger. I
don't know.
MS. MASUCCI: Our case load in terms of these types of cases,
which are categorized primarily as wrongful discharge and discrimina-
tion, are under two hundred cases. We have seen an increase in those
cases, but they are still relatively low as compared to the remainder of
our docket.
We have already segregated specific arbitrators with background in
these issues to select when these cases arise. So, we're really not using
the same pool of arbitrators who decide the regular securities case to
decide these types of cases.
I want to take the liberty of just raising a concern I have about what
I've heard around the table. It concerns the arbitrator education
requirements.
222. See Peter T. Kilborn, Backlog of Cases Is Overwhelming Jobs-Bias Agency,
N.Y. Tunes, Nov. 26, 1994, at 1; see also Peter T. Kilborn, A Family Spirals Downward
In Waiting for Agency to Act, N.Y. Tunes, Feb. 11, 1995, at 1 (noting that the General
Accounting Office raised questions about the EEOC's procedure, competence, and
insufficient budget).
223. Confidentiality in mediation is currently receiving attention. See Margaret A.
Jacobs, Case to Test Confidentiality of Mediations, Wall St. J., Mar. 3, 1995, at B16
(reporting about a case in which Virginia's highest court ordered a woman to accept a
settlement and forgo a trial, "in part because of something she said in mediation").
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Once you impose higher requirements, higher requirements than
we currently have on arbitrators to attend specific series of training
courses, as well as to have certain backgrounds, there's a concurrent
obligation to use those individuals more. You end up creating a spe-
cial cadre of arbitrators, something that we have been criticized for
doing in the past.
Although a lot of the commentators today said they want arbitra-
tors to have experience or expertise in this area, whatever word you
want to use, my staff is regularly faced with arguments that are di-
rectly opposite. A plaintiff's attorney desires individual arbitrators
that have no experience in this area. They want to teach the arbitra-
tors the law.
So, when administering these cases we're faced with the dilemma of
which way to jump: Do we use a small cadre of arbitrators or do we
use them once every five years? Do we have highly experienced arbi-
trators or do we have inexperienced arbitrators?
That's just to give you an overview of what the administrators have
to deal with on a day-to-day basis.
MR. CLEMENTE: I would like to touch on the issue that Ted
raised earlier: we have been handling employment-related cases for
many years prior to Gilmer.224 Those cases were, however, primarily
in the realm of contract, compensation, and bonus disputes.
We have not experienced any major increase in the number of
claims alleging employment discrimination since Gilmer. In 1990 we
had two claims; eighteen in 1991; in 1992-the first full year after Gil-
mer-again only eighteen claims; twenty-one in 1993; and, to date,
sixteen claims in 1994.
If you look at the year 1993, for which I have complete statistics,
post-Gilmer, you will note that out of 244 cases involving employ-
ment-related disputes filed (the majority of which were filed against
registered representatives), only twenty-one of them alleged any type
of harassment, discrimination, or civil rights claim. And the majority
of those cases also contained other claims such as breach of contract.
During the period January 1990 through November 28, 1994, a total
of seventy-five employment disputes with claims alleging discrimina-
tion were filed at the Exchange. Of those seventy-five disputes, the
most frequently alleged claims were for age discrimination (thirty),
and gender discrimination (twenty-eight), plus seven claims that al-
leged both.
To date, forty-eight of the seventy-five claims have been resolved-
thirty by decision of the arbitrators and eighteen through settlements.
Of those cases resolved, sixty-seven percent resulted in a monetary
224. NYSE Rule 347, which requires that disputes arising out of employment or
termination of employment be submitted to arbitration, was adopted in 1958. NYSE
Rules, supra note 14, Rule 347, 1 2347.
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award or settlement for the employee. Of those decided by arbitra-
tors, fifty percent were decided in favor of the employee.
In the four years that I've tracked them, less than one-half of one
percent of our total case volume has involved claims alleging discrimi-
nation or any other civil rights type claim. At present we have only
twenty-five of these cases pending.
MR. SMITH: I have a two-part question for Mrs. Vladeck.
The first question is, are you opposed to all employment disputes
being arbitrated under the current system at the SROs? And if not,
and you are only opposed to employment discrimination cases being
arbitrated, are you opposed to all discrimination cases being arbi-
trated or just certain cases?
The reason I ask that is, you today, in your remarks, as all commen-
tators, have only focused on the arbitration of sex discrimination or
sex harassment cases. Nobody seems to be commenting on whether
disability cases or age discrimination cases belong in arbitration.
MS. VLADECK: I don't know why we seem to be concentrating
on sex discrimination cases, except I believe the attack to which I was
responding on the Exchange's behalf, on the inadequacy of the pro-
cess, had focused on awards in sexual harassment cases. And so I
think maybe I've been talking about sex discrimination as if it were a
unique piece of the problem. I don't think so. I think discrimina-
tion-whether it is discrimination against women or African-Ameri-
cans or other minority groups, or people who suffer from disabilities
as defined under the statute-I think that whole body of law, discrimi-
nation law, is what I have been referring to as mysterious to the arbi-
trators to whom we must turn these cases over for decision.
And so, it was not intentional that I was speaking of only one piece
or one kind of discrimination. I think the word that I would like to
substitute is "invidious" discrimination.
MR. SMITH: Are you opposed to all employment disputes being
arbitrated?
MS. VLADECK: I have no opposition to any employment dispute
being arbitrated. My concern is that I don't like the imposition of this
as the only avenue of relief for people who work in your industry, and
I wish we could modify that somewhat.
And secondly, I don't like the statutory issues being presented to
people who by and large have no training in how to sort them out,
how to look at them.
MR. SMITH: So, you are opposed to all imposition of arbitration
of employment disputes, not just discrimination cases?
MS. VLADECK: I would oppose any mandatory arbitration gener-
ically, but that's not for this room. I don't think I am going to get
anybody to reverse Gilmer for a while. I think that's in the far future.
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MR. DUBOW: I just have two comments. The first is, I just want
to address the issue that there is no redress for employees in arbitra-
tion, that the results are very small. The reason I say that is that if in
fact there were a stacked deck, and that, therefore, the employers
could do fairly well in an employment arbitration, it would be a rare
case that was settled by an employer. I know that all member firms
have settled employment disputes before they ever went to arbitra-
tion. In many cases it was for significant amounts of money, even
though they knew they would have to go to arbitration if they did not
settle it.
So, the fact is that they must realize that they cannot win these cases
that are bad cases, in arbitration-that's why they settle them. So, I
think that the argument that the employee fares poorly is not as
strong as indicated.
I've also seen arbitrators follow the statutes. For example, there
was a statement made by Ms. Vladeck that arbitrators don't award
attorneys' fees in these cases, and I know that they have done so. Per-
haps they have not done so in all cases, but I have seen cases where
arbitrators have awarded attorneys' fees to successful employees after
arbitrations are concluded.
The last point I want to make, as far as arbitrator training is con-
cerned, I think everybody agrees that there should be more training of
arbitrators in the area of employment, and there are arbitrators out
there who do this. I happen to be a member of the advisory council to
the northern California offices of the American Arbitration Associa-
tion. I'm from San Francisco. And the American Arbitration Associ-
ation has asked their San Francisco office to enter into an experiment,
which is not complete, but it's interesting.
First, a council was appointed consisting of attorneys who practice
employment law in San Francisco or the San Francisco area, both
plaintiff lawyers and defense lawyers, and I was one of the ones who
was appointed to that council.
We, in turn, have now developed a group of arbitrators. Anybody
who wanted to do an employment arbitration as an arbitrator in the
Bay Area through the AAA has to be approved by this employment
council, and applications are made, resumes are provided. As a con-
sequence, even though we are equally divided between plaintiff and
defense lawyers, we've had very little difficulty determining who are
qualified arbitrators and who are not. And so we've developed in San
Francisco from practitioners or experts in the area of arbitration a se-
lect panel of over one hundred people.
Where it will lead, I don't know, because we've just done this and
we are just beginning the arbitration process, but presumably if that
could be done in San Francisco, it could be done elsewhere.
And perhaps one thing that the SROs might be interested in doing
is to combine with the AAA and have a panel, assuming the AAA
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does this elsewhere, as well as San Francisco. Perhaps in that way a
panel could be developed that would be already trained from their
other lives. There would be no need to spend the money, to spend a
week or so training.
MR. MATrEA: I've heard a lot around this table about improving
the training of arbitrators and about having written decisions, and I
assume that would mean findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
even dismissing cases, before a hearing, based on the law.
That suggests to me that we should consider what the role of the
court ought to be in reviewing the arbitrators' findings as to what the
law says. Should the court have some role in saying, are the arbitra-
tors getting the law right?
MS. VLADECK: If you are going to impose an appellate system
on the process, then you will destroy it. I don't think anybody is rec-
ommending having an arbitrator's award track a court decision, but I
do think there should be some kind of a checklist where, if there are
statutory issues about damages and attorneys' fees and so on, that it
should show that at least that was considered.
As to the reasoning, in New York certainly, and I think this is the
general law throughout the United States, arbitrators are permitted to
make mistakes of law or fact, but you're not going to let them do it
too damn many times. And if they have to publish their reasoning
and they look like the damn fools that you've thought they were, then
they're through.
I mean, the market will take over and we will get rid of those peo-
ple. And the word will be out. And they won't do it to another em-
ployee. I think it's the only way we can control them. Also, they will
have to pay attention if they have to write, and some of them I think
will find that very onerous, but I think it would be good education for
them to have to write. It would also keep them honest.
MR. ROGERS: Just in further response, there is a well-established
body of law concerning the appealability of arbitrators' decisions, and
I think it is adequate. The general watchword here in New York, and
I think in the federal courts as well, is if the arbitrators have acted in
manifest disregard of the law, then the decision can be reviewed and
possibly overturned.
Similarly, of course, there's always an opportunity to review pro-
ceedings for bias, corruption, etc. It seems to me that if you go any
further than you are to what Judith is saying, you're destroying the
process.
PROF. KATSORIS: Would you like to define manifest disregard?
MR. ROGERS: Really, really bad disregard.
MR. MATrEA: I mean, you basically can't do it. That's the point.
MR. ROGERS: I think you can. I think if arbitrators get it right,
saying the law requires X, it provides that the plaintiff must bear the
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burden of proving discrimination, and we find that based on these
facts the plaintiff has shown discrimination, the arbitrators will not be
reversed. They may be damn fools, because there can be damn fools
deciding both sides of the case. It is not only the damn fools who are
deciding in favor of the employer.
MR. MAT=EA: The reason I raise it is, it goes to this element of
compulsion. You know, if you're compelled to go to arbitration and
the arbitrator gets the law wrong, you are finished.
MR. ROGERS: Well, you're not finished.
MR. MATTEA: You've got nowhere to go.
MR. ROGERS: Look, a lot of the issue on compulsion, I'll even
use the term although I think there is a pejorative element to it, is
overstated. The idea is not that anybody's giving up any rights. They
are having them adjudicated in a different forum in a different way.
One of those different ways, admittedly, is that appeals are limited
more strictly than they would be in the courts. The flip side of that is
that everyone gets to a result quicker and sooner, and, I think, fairer.
MR. MATI7EA: I guess I'll just follow up one last time, which is
that it is well to encourage the use of a low-cost, quicker process. It is
another thing to compel it. I mean, and I do think it goes to the issue
of fairness.
MR. ROGERS: Well, that's something on which reasonable people
can differ.
MS. VLADECK: That's what divides us right here.
MR. CELLA: It is a very interesting point. The Supreme Court in
McMahon never directly addressed the question of contractual adhe-
sion, though it was argued by the plaintiffs in that case= And indeed
they had other reasons to do what they did.
I don't know if there's been any clear judicial decision vis-a-vis an
employee who has to sign a document in order to work in the industry
that compels him to arbitrate under a very broad arbitration clause all
of his or her disputes.
That raises an interesting question that I don't think is yet resolved,
which is why you can't have motions for summary judgment, because
arbitration first, whether correct or not, does smack of some equity.
And since you have arbitrators sitting in labor law matters who are
not experts by definition at this time, with possible minor exceptions,
to bring to them a motion for summary judgment to knock out a
claimant's claim in a nonjudicial forum is not going to work, until
maybe you have highly professional, full-time labor law arbitrators in
a securities system, and I don't think you are going to see that soon, if
ever.
225. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1987).
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MR. EPPENSTEIN: On the issue of compulsory arbitration, for
those of you who were here on November 21st, I was one of the
speakers on the pre-dispute arbitration clause issue. 26
My recollection, having argued McMahon, was that Chief Justice
Rehnquist, when I tried to get into this area of contract of adhesion,
did not want to get into it and led me down a different road, which I
took.
But it was my recollection in preparing for that case, there was the
Alexander v. Gardne22 7 case, which was a 1974 United States
Supreme Court case where Justice Powell spoke about the distrust of
arbitration in this area.2 28
And then there was the Barrentine22 9 case, which was a 1981 case,
and that was followed by the McDonald v. City of West Branch2 30
case, which was a 1984 case, all speaking about the distrust of arbitra-
tion in the employment dispute area and under Title VII.
The issue of contract of adhesion, I think, was covered last time,
and I think it will become more and more prominent in this area as we
go along, because we do see these, as Justice O'Connor mentioned,
bargained-for contracts, becoming compulsory, more and more.
MR. ROGERS: You are quite correct that there were statements
of distrust of arbitration, but those cases all predated what's happened
in the ensuing twenty years, and Gilmer specifically addressed and re-
jected them.
There were other reasons to distinguish Gardner-Denver. For ex-
ample, the labor arbitration in Gardner-Denver was one where the
union was representing the employee's interests and the court said
that's different from arbitration where the employee's representing his
or her interests and won't have a possible conflict or problem with
fair representation. A short answer is the courts, and you can ques-
tion their motives if you want, but the courts have clearly said-and
the Supreme Court in Gilmer then wrapped it up-that the old judi-
cial distrust of arbitration is a thing of the past.
MS. VLADECK: Fair is fair, though. Barrentine didn't say judicial
distrust. It said that there is statutory esteem, that there are public
policy issues that are so important. We're not going to trust them to
anybody other than the federal courts and that's what they said. And
that's what Barrentine said.
But here we're taking what was declared to be the most compelling
public policy of the United States thirty years ago. Nobody has the
guts to say it's not a compelling public policy anymore or we don't
give a damn about it anymore or forget eliminating job discrimination.
226. See supra pp. 1511-32.
227. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
228. Id. at 56.
229. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
230. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
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We've killed unions. Let's kill the statutory protection for workers.
Let's wait for a revolution. I mean, maybe this is really the thinking,
but let's not bury it.
The statutory purpose that the Supreme Court said in Barrentine
was not going to be just turned over. They always have to be coming
back to the courts that were going to protect this public policy.
If they have abandoned it, it has been a very cynical thing, and we
have to say you can't try to reconcile them. It is a cynical decision,
saying workers are not going to be protected.
MR. ROGERS: I just need to respond on the public policy point.
You can't lose sight of the fact that the EEOC is still there. The State
Division of Human Rights is still there.
The U-4 is not barring anybody from filing a claim with the EEOC
saying my former employer did the rottenest thing to me or to other
people just based on my sex, and if there really is some violation of
public policy and the way they've done it, the administrative agency
can run with it.
Gilmer did not give the New York Stock Exchange that role. That
role is still where it always has been. All Gilmer said is that arbitra-
tion is a very effective forum for the resolution of individuals' claims.
The New York Court of Appeals, in a follow-up to Gilmer, based on
New York State law, in a case that I argued and in which Mr. Liftin's
firm was a co-party with my client, affirmed the same and followed
Gilmer.231
MS. ZUCHLEWSKI: I have two very brief comments that I
wanted to do as wrap-up; I don't want to engage in a debate about
Gilmer. First, I want to comment about Jay Waks' proposal for
mandatory mediation. I don't have a strong feeling on this, but I think
it has to be looked at very carefully. My belief is that voluntary medi-
ation where both parties are committed to the process can be a very
useful device.
Mandatory mediation that layers on another procedural level that
leads to delay when both parties aren't committed to the process is
just going to increase the expense and time. Therefore, if the Ex-
change is considering mandatory mediation, it should do so very, very
carefully, looking at both the positive aspects of it as well as the nega-
tive aspects.
Second, there have been some remarks during the course of these
discussions about motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment,
and other procedural devices. My personal opinion is that such prac-
tices graft some of the worst parts of the judicial process onto arbitra-
tion without achieving the gains in expediency and economy that we
are supposed to be getting in arbitration. I suggest that such proce-
231. Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 619 N.E.2d 998 (N.Y. 1993).
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dural devices be reviewed very carefully before they are permitted to
become part of the procedure.
MR. CLEMENTE: I would like to raise an issue regarding the so-
called compulsory nature of arbitration that was raised at the Novem-
ber 21st Symposium in the area of customer agreements; that is, the
acceptability of a window, of say, forty-five days, where either side
could object to arbitration, as opposed to the process we have now.23 2
MR. WAKS: I think you have to choose a procedure that member
firms and those who are registered with the Exchange are bound to,
and that's that. To permit one side or the other to opt out, in effect,
mandatorily opting out for the other as well, seems a bit unfair to me.
It is tantamount to permitting one side or the other to opt in.
Getting back to my comment on mediation, if I did say mandatory
mediation, I apologize. I didn't intend that my suggestion be that
there be mandatory mediation, but only that there be a procedure that
is available should the parties wish to mediate. And by the Exchange
proposing it, it takes the onus off of the parties to impose it on each
other.
With respect to summary judgment, you can call it whatever you
wish. You can call it a motion to narrow the issues, but that's exactly
what it would serve. It would narrow the issues in arbitration, which
so many times involves a multitude of state and federal issues that
don't have a hint of success, but nevertheless are arbitrated to the
fullest, by both sides, simply because the arbitrators may find some
justice served by ultimately adjudicating in favor of one side or the
other at the end of the case. So, I think it does serve the interests of
expedition.
PROF. KATSORIS: Okay. I think our comments on this subject
are exhausted.
232. See supra pp. 1522-26.
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